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A term expresses a thick concept if it expresses a specific evaluative concept that is also 
substantially descriptive.  It is a matter of debate how this rough account should be 
unpacked,  but examples can help to convey the basic idea.  Thick concepts are often 
illustrated with virtue concepts like courageous and generous, action concepts like murder and 
betray, epistemic concepts like dogmatic and wise, and aesthetic concepts like gaudy and 
brilliant.  These concepts seem to be evaluative, unlike purely descriptive concepts such as 
red and water.  But they also seem different from general evaluative concepts.  In particular, 
thick concepts are typically contrasted with thin concepts like good, wrong, permissible, and 
ought, which are general evaluative concepts that do not seem substantially descriptive.  
When Jane says that Max is good, she appears to be evaluating him without providing much 
description, if any.  Thick concepts, on the other hand, are evaluative and substantially 
descriptive at the same time.  For instance, when Max says that Jane is courageous, he seems 
to be doing two things: evaluating her positively and describing her as willing to face risk.  
Because of their descriptiveness, thick concepts are especially good candidates for evaluative 
concepts that pick out properties in the world. Thus they provide an avenue for thinking 
about ethical claims as being about the world in the same way as descriptive claims.  
 
Thick concepts became a focal point in ethics during the second half of the twentieth 
century.  At that time, discussions of thick concepts began to emerge in response to certain 
disagreements about thin concepts.  For example, in twentieth-century ethics, 
consequentialists and deontologists hotly debated various accounts of good and right. It was 
also claimed by non-cognitivists and error-theorists that these thin concepts do not 
correspond to any properties in the world.  Dissatisfaction with these viewpoints prompted 
many ethicists to consider the implications of thick concepts.  The notion of a thick concept 
was thought to provide insight into meta-ethical questions such as whether there is a fact-
value distinction, whether there are ethical truths, and, if there are such truths, whether 
these truths are objective.  Some ethicists also theorized about the role that thick concepts 
can play in normative ethics, such as in virtue theory. By the beginning of the twenty-first 
century, the interest in thick concepts had spread to other philosophical disciplines such as 
epistemology, aesthetics, metaphysics, moral psychology, and the philosophy of law.   
 
Nevertheless, the emerging interest in thick concepts has sparked debates over many 
questions: How exactly are thick concepts evaluative?  How do they combine evaluation and 
description?  How are thick concepts related to thin concepts?  And do thick concepts have 
the sort of significance commonly attributed to them?  This entry surveys various attempts at 
answering these questions.  
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1.  Background and Preliminaries 
Bernard Williams first introduced the phrase ‘thick concept’ in his 1985 book, Ethics and the 
Limits of Philosophy.  Williams used this phrase to classify a number of ethical concepts that 
are plausibly controlled by the facts, such as treachery, brutality, and courage.  But his use of 
the phrase was assimilated from Clifford Geertz’ notion of a thick description—an 
anthropologist’s tool for describing “a multiplicity of complex conceptual structures, many 
of them superimposed upon or knotted into one another” (1973:).  Incidentally, Geertz 
borrowed the phrase ‘thick description’ from Gilbert Ryle, who took thick description to be 
a way of categorizing actions and personality traits by reference to intentions, desires, and 
beliefs (1971).  Although Geertz’ and Ryle’s notions of thick description influenced 
Williams’ terminology, their notions did not necessarily involve evaluation.  By contrast, 
Williams’ notion of a thick concept is bound up with both evaluation and description.  Or, 
in Williams’ terms, thick concepts are both “action-guiding” and “guided by the world”.  
They are action-guiding in that they typically indicate the presence of reasons for action, and 
they are world-guided in that their correct application depends on how the world is (1985: 
128, 140-41). 
 
Although the phrase ‘thick concept’ first appeared in Williams’ Ethics and the Limits of 
Philosophy, there was a distinction between thick and thin that predated Williams’ 1985 
book.  In R.M. Hare’s The Language of Morals, published in 1952, Hare distinguished 
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between primarily evaluative words and secondarily evaluative words (121-2). Hare later 
identified the former with thin terms, and the latter with thick terms (1997:54).  So, the 
idea of a thick term was present in ethics well before Williams’ terminology. 
 
Hare’s distinction between thick and thin is explicitly about words, and it makes no mention 
of concepts.  But, in general, the literature on the thick speaks about both thick concepts 
and thick terms.  Very roughly, concepts are on the level of propositions and meanings 
(broadly construed), whereas terms are the linguistic entities used to express these items.  In 
this entry, expressions with single-quotes, for example ‘chaste’, will be used to designate 
terms.  Italicized expressions, for example chaste, will be used to designate concepts.  Thick 
concepts, then, can approximately be seen as the meanings of thick terms. 
 
Thick and thin terms are  two distinct subclasses of the evaluative.  However, readers should 
exercise caution when encountering the phrase ‘thin term’, since some theorists allow 
wholly descriptive terms like ‘red’, ‘grass’, and ‘green’ to count as thin (for example, Elgin 
2008: 372).  Their usage of ‘thin’ diverges from prevailing philosophical jargon, where the 
thin is seen as a subclass of the evaluative.  This entry uses the prevailing jargon: on this way 
of speaking, there are no wholly descriptive thin terms. 
 
It is typically claimed that thick terms are in some sense evaluative and descriptive, but what 
do these notions mean?  The evaluative and the descriptive are normally meant to distinguish 
between two classes of terms.  Descriptive terms can be illustrated with words like ‘red’, 
‘solid’, ‘small’, ‘tall’, ‘water’, ‘cat’, and ‘hydrogen’.  Paradigmatic evaluative terms include 
thin terms like ‘good’, ‘bad’, and ‘best’, as well as normative words like ‘ought’, ‘should’, 
‘right’, and ‘wrong’.  Although some theorists deny that there is any substantive difference 
between the descriptive and the evaluative (for example, Jackson 1998:120),  on the face of 
it there is a difference. Various attempts have been made to account for this putative 
difference.  Two general approaches are relevant for our purposes. 
 
One approach stems from traditional non-cognitivism.  On this view, descriptive terms 
express beliefs and are capable of picking out properties and facts.  But paradigmatic 
evaluative terms, such as ‘good’ and ‘right’, have neither of these features.  These terms do 
not express beliefs and are incapable of picking out properties and facts.  Instead, the 
function of an evaluative term is to express and induce attitudes, or to commend, condemn, 
and instruct.  Basically, for traditional non-cognitivism, descriptive expressions are capable 
of representing properties and facts, whereas evaluative ones express attitudes or 
imperatives that cannot represent properties or facts.  Since this version of the distinction 
denies that evaluations can be factual, we can call it the strong distinction.   
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The strong distinction is also known as the fact/value distinction. Thick terms are often seen 
as a problem for this distinction because they seem both descriptive and evaluative.  Indeed, 
Williams holds that the world-guidedness of thick concepts “is enough to refute the simplest 
oppositions of fact and value” (1985:150).                    
 
There is also a weak distinction between description and evaluation, which is neutral on the 
question of whether evaluations can be factual.  Proponents of this weak distinction may 
agree with the strong distinction regarding the primary function of evaluative terms.  For 
example, they might agree that evaluative terms function to express and induce attitudes, or 
to commend, condemn, and instruct. However, they do not rule out the possibility that 
evaluations are also factual.  What then distinguishes the evaluative from the descriptive?  
Simply put, descriptive terms are all the other predicates within a language—that is, 
descriptive terms just are non-evaluative.  Since this distinction allows that evaluations can 
be factual, we can call it the weak distinction. 
 
Thick terms are seen as significant because they straddle the above distinctions—they have 
something in common with both the evaluative and the descriptive.  Consequently, thick 
terms raise interesting questions about whether there is value in the world and whether 
value claims can be inferred from factual ones.  The main arguments and views in this 
vicinity are from Philippa Foot, John McDowell, and Bernard Williams, which are discussed 
next.   
 
 
2. Significance of Thick Concepts 
 
a. Foot’s Argument against the Is-Ought Gap   
David Hume is often interpreted as holding that one cannot derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’, 
or more generally, that one cannot derive an evaluative statement from a purely descriptive 
statement.  This view has some intuitive appeal.  The basic thought is that evaluative 
statements can condemn, commend and instruct, whereas descriptive statements can do 
none of these things. So any inference from purely descriptive premises to an evaluative 
conclusion would involve a conclusion with content nowhere expressed in its premises. 
Hence, the inference as a result must be invalid.  If we do have a valid inference to an 
evaluative conclusion, then the premises must somehow involve evaluative content, perhaps 
covertly.  This claim that there are no conceptually valid inferences from purely descriptive 
premises to evaluative conclusions is known as the “is-ought gap”. 
 
The is-ought gap may seem plausible when the evaluative conclusion employs thin terms like 
‘right’ and ‘wrong’. Philippa Foot rejects the is-ought gap by focusing instead on an 
evaluative conclusion that employs a thick term: ‘rude’.  She points out that ‘rude’ should 
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count as evaluative, because it seems to express an attitude, or to condemn, much like ‘bad’ 
and ‘wrong’.  But, according to Foot, this evaluation can be derived from a description.  
Consider the description D1: that x causes offence by indicating a lack of respect.  Can one 
accept D1 as true, but deny that x is rude?  Foot thinks this denial would be inconsistent.  If 
she is right, then  a thick evaluative claim—that x is rude—can be derived from a 
descriptive claim (Foot 1958).    
 
Foot’s argument is primarily aimed at non-cognitivists, like Hare.  But Hare replies by 
considering an analogous inference involving a racial slur.  To demonstrate Hare’s point, 
consider a racial slur like ‘gringo’, ‘kraut’, or ‘honky’.  Most of us disagree with the attitude 
of contempt that is expressed by the slur ‘kraut’.  But, according to Hare, an analogous 
inference would logically require us to accept that attitude—that is, to despise Germans.  
And this is absurd.  Consider the descriptive claim D1*: that x is a native of Germany.  Is it 
logically consistent for one to accept D1* as true but deny that x is a kraut?  If the denial in 
Foot’s example is inconsistent, then, according to Hare’s thinking, it should also be 
inconsistent in this example.  So, by Foot’s reasoning, D1* should entail ‘x is a kraut’.  
Moreover, ‘kraut’ is a term of contempt, which means that this conclusion entails that one 
must despise x.  By the transitivity of entailment, it follows that an acceptance of D1* 
requires one to despise x, which is an unintuitive result.  According to Hare, the two 
inferences are “identical in form.”  So, there must be something wrong with both inferences 
(1963:188). 
 
Where do the above inferences go wrong?  Hare holds that people who reject the attitude 
associated with ‘kraut’ will substitute it with an evaluatively-neutral expression, such as 
‘German’, which does not commit them to the attitude of contempt.  So, people who 
accept D1* are not required to use the evaluative word ‘kraut’ in expressing the conclusion 
of the inference.  Analogous points hold for ‘rude’. Hare concedes that we rarely have 
evaluatively-neutral expressions corresponding to paradigmatic thick terms, but he thinks 
such expressions are at least possible.  After all, we could use ‘rude’ with a certain tone of 
voice or with scare-quotes around it, thereby indicating that we mean it in a purely 
descriptive sense (1963:188-89).  
 
Hare’s response to Foot assumes that slurs are evaluative in the same way as thick terms.  
This, however, has been taken by some to be unintuitive.  But Hare could modify his reply: 
instead of employing slurs he could use thick terms like ‘chaste’, ‘blasphemous’, ‘perverse’, 
and ‘lewd’, which are often called “objectionable thick terms”. Objectionable thick terms 
are terms that embody values that ought to be rejected.  It is, of course, a matter of debate 
whether these thick terms really are objectionable. Hare could run his argument by using 
thick terms that are commonly regarded as objectionable.  Such terms seem to be evaluative 
in much the same way as ‘rude’.  And, much like slurs, there are many people who reject 
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the values embodied by such terms; these people are consequently reluctant to use the term 
in question. Notice that arguments like Foot’s would require such people to accept the 
values embodied by the thick terms they regard as objectionable, and this seems equally 
implausible.  So, Hare’s basic reply need not assume any fundamental similarity between 
thick terms and slurs. 
 
However, it is unclear that Hare has shown what he needs to show—that the relevant is-
ought inferences are invalid.  In particular, he has not shown that it’s possible for D1 to be 
true while ‘x is rude’ is false, or for D1* to be true while ‘x is a kraut’ is false.  The mere 
fact that reluctant speakers will substitute the evaluative conclusions with neutral ones does 
not show that the evaluative conclusions are false.  For instance, you may hate the word 
‘prune’ and prefer to substitute it with ‘dried plum’, but that doesn’t mean it’s false that the 
thing in question is a prune (Foot 1958:509).   
 
Hare  could claim that the is-ought gap only exists on the level of concepts or propositions, 
not on the level of terms or sentences.  This makes a difference because Hare holds that the 
evaluations of thick terms are detachable in the sense that there could be evaluatively-neutral 
expressions that are propositionally equivalent to sentences involving thick terms.  
Detachability is the upshot of Hare’s view that ‘German’ can be substituted for ‘kraut’.  If 
the evaluations of thick terms are detachable, then they only attach to the terms, but are not 
entailed by the propositions expressed by such terms.  So, there is no breach of the is-ought 
gap on the level of propositions.  From D1, one can infer the proposition that x is German.  
And this proposition can also be expressed by using the term ‘kraut’.  But one cannot infer a 
negative evaluation from this proposition; the negative evaluation is only inferable from uses 
the term ‘kraut’, not from the proposition expressed by such uses. 
 
Hare’s view that the evaluations of thick terms are detachable has led to debates over how 
exactly thick terms are evaluative.  For example, is the evaluation merely pragmatically 
associated with the term  in a way that would make it detachable?  Or are these evaluations 
part of its truth-conditions?  These debates are discussed in section 5.     
  
b. McDowell’s Disentangling Argument 
Even if Foot is right that there are descriptions that are sufficient for the correct application 
of thick terms, it need not be the case that these descriptions are necessary.  John 
McDowell’s Disentangling Argument is believed to show that there could not be a 
description that is both necessary and sufficient for the correct application of a thick term.  
In this argument McDowell is primarily arguing against non-cognitivists, such as Hare, who 
accept the strong distinction between description and evaluation.   
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Before diving into the argument, recall that thick terms seem to straddle the strong 
distinction.  For example, the claim that OJ committed murder seems to aim at stating a 
fact, which is a feature of descriptive claims (on the strong distinction).  But this claim also 
seems evaluative; by calling it murder, rather than killing, we seem to be evaluating OJ’s 
action negatively.  Thus, thick terms such as ‘murder’ call into doubt the strong distinction 
because they seem to be both descriptive and evaluative.  This issue does not present any 
obvious challenge to those who accept only the weak distinction, since a term’s being 
evaluative on the weak-distinction does not preclude it from being fact-stating.  How do 
proponents of the strong distinction meet this challenge? 
 
A.J. Ayer is one non-cognitivist who holds that thick terms like ‘hideous’, ‘beautiful’, and 
‘virtue’ are solely on the evaluative side of the strong distinction—they are purely non-
factual, evaluative concepts (1946:108-13).  Ayer’s view is counterintuitive, and, if 
generalized, would oddly entail that there is no fact as to whether OJ committed murder.   
 
Most non-cognitivists disagree with Ayer, and claim that thick terms have hybrid meanings 
that contain two different kinds of content: a descriptive content and an evaluative content.  
This kind of view is called a Reductive View because it reduces the meaning of a thick term 
to a descriptive content along with a more basic evaluative content (for example, a thin 
concept).   
 
McDowell’s Disentangling Argument targets a specific kind of Reductive View, one that is 
coupled with the strong distinction between description and evaluation.  We may thus call 
his target “the Strong Reductive View”.  McDowell assumes that Strong Reductive Views 
must hold that the thick concept’s descriptive content completely determines the thick 
concept’s extension. It does so by identifying a property that completely determines what 
does and does not fall within the thick concept’s extension.  The evaluative content plays no 
role in determining what property the thick concept picks out, but is instead an attitudinal 
or prescriptive tag that explains the concept’s evaluative perspective.   
 
McDowell’s argument against Strong Reductive Views invites us to consider the epistemic 
position of an outsider who does not share the evaluative perspective associated with a given 
thick term.  Consider, for example, someone who fails to understand the sexual mores 
associated with ‘chaste’.  Will this person be able to anticipate what this term applies to in 
new cases?  Initially, one might think this is possible: is  this not what anthropologists are 
trained to do?  Williams, a proponent of McDowell’s argument, says that anthropologists 
must at least “grasp imaginatively” the evaluative point of ‘chaste’ (1985:142).  She must 
imagine that she accepts the evaluative point of this term, at least for the purposes of 
anticipating its usage. Even this might be a problem for Strong Reductive Views.  If a Strong 
Reductive View is correct, then there would be no need for an outsider to grasp the 
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evaluative content of ‘chaste’, even imaginatively.  After all, the descriptive content is 
supposedly what drives the extension of ‘chaste’, which means that an unsympathetic 
outsider could master its extension just by grasping the descriptive content and observing 
that it applies to all and only the features that the insiders call ‘chaste’.  So, the Strong 
Reductive View seems to predict that an unsympathetic outsider could anticipate the 
insider’s usage of ‘chaste’. Many find this implausible. 
 
McDowell’s argument has two premises: (1) If a Strong Reductive View is true of ‘chaste’, 
then an unsympathetic outsider could master the extension of ‘chaste’ (that is, she could 
know what things ‘chaste’ would apply to in new cases) without having any grasp of its 
evaluative content.  But, (2) an unsympathetic outsider surely could not achieve this—she 
could not anticipate its usage if she stands completely outside the evaluative perspective of 
those who employ the concept.  Therefore, the Strong Reductive View is not true of 
‘chaste’ (1981:201-3).  This sort of argument could be advanced with respect to any thick 
term and perhaps even thin ones. 
 
The Disentangling Argument is sometimes thought to be a distinctive problem for all 
Reductive Views, not just Strong Reductive Views.  But this is a mistake.  Consider 
Reductive Views that accept only a weak distinction between description and evaluation: 
call such views “Weak Reductive Views”.  Weak Reductive Views can allow that the 
evaluative content of ‘chaste’ picks out a property, and can therefore allow that this 
evaluative content plays a role in determining the extension of ‘chaste’.  For example, if 
morally good is the evaluative content associated with ‘chaste’, and morally good picks out a 
property, then morally good can also play a role in determining the extension of ‘chaste’. This 
means that its extension need not be completely determined by its descriptive content. In 
this case, an unsympathetic outsider would be a very strange person—that is, someone who 
does not accept the evaluative point of morally good, even imaginatively.  But such a person 
does not seem impossible. 
 
To be sure, Weak Reductive Views could be vulnerable to the Disentangling Argument if 
they accept an additional claim, namely, that chaste is coextensive with a descriptive concept 
that is perhaps not encoded within the content of chaste.  Consider an analogy: it isplausible 
that water and H2O are coextensive, even though neither concept is encoded within the 
other.  If Weak Reductive Views hold that this situation is true of chaste and some 
descriptive concept D, which is not encoded in the content of chaste, then the Disentangling 
Argument could be run against these views.  This type of Weak Reductive View predicts 
that an outsider could master the extension of ‘chaste’ just by grasping D and observing that 
insiders apply ‘chaste’ to all and only things that are D.  Thus, the Disentangling Argument 
could be run against Weak Reductive Views if they accept the additional claim that chaste is 
coextensive with a descriptive concept.   




However, the same problem also arises for Non-Reductive Views that accept this additional 
claim.  Non-Reductive Views hold that thick concepts cannot be divided into distinct 
contents (more on this in section 3).  And, strictly speaking, Non-Reductive Views are 
compatible with the additional claim just mentioned—that chaste is coextensive with a 
descriptive concept.  If Non-Reductivists accept this additional claim—which would be 
uncharacteristic, though not inconsistent— then the combined view would also be 
vulnerable to the Disentangling Argument.   
 
So, the Disentangling Argument can be used to target any view, Reductive or Non-
Reductive, that holds thick concepts to be coextensive with descriptive concepts.  It is thus a 
mistake to think the Disentangling Argument is a problem for all and only Reductive Views.  
The reason McDowell’s argument targets Strong Reductive Views is that these views appear 
fit to accept the problematic claim—that thick concepts are coextensive with descriptive 
concepts. 
 
Most opponents of the Disentangling Argument reject premise (1), by showing that Strong 
Reductive Views can allow that an unsympathetic outsider could not master the extension of 
thick terms. This approach is discussed in section 3a.  But Hare takes a different approach.  
He accepts the Strong Reductive View but rejects premise (2).  Recall Hare’s way of arguing 
that there could be a descriptive concept that is extensionally equivalent to a thick concept.  
One can express this descriptive concept by muting the thick term’s evaluative content in 
one of two ways: either by using the thick term with a certain tone of voice or by placing 
scare-quotes around the term.  Suppose that these methods successfully show that there is a 
purely descriptive concept—call it des-chaste—which is coextensive with chaste.  In this case, 
an outsider could employ des-chaste to track the insider’s usage of ‘chaste’.   
 
One might object that Hare’s two methods of uncovering des-chaste reveal that this concept 
cannot be grasped without already grasping chaste.  So, the interpreter in question would not 
be a genuine outsider.  However, although Hare’s methods of uncovering des-chaste require a 
grasp of chaste, there is no automatic reason to assume that there could not be another 
method of uncovering des-chaste without grasping chaste—for example, by learning des-chaste 
independently of any encounter with insiders or their value system.  
 
Would the outsider’s grasp of des-chaste help her anticipate the insider’s use of ‘chaste’ in 
new cases?  Hare thinks so.  According to Hare, the outsider could anticipate their use in 
new cases because she could observe similarities between the old cases and the new cases, 
and infer based on those similarities that ‘chaste’ would or would not apply in new cases 
(1997: 61).  Of course, McDowell and followers would not be convinced by this claim, 
since they hold that the similarities between such cases are evaluative.  In other words, they 
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accept what is known as “the shapelessness hypothesis”—that the extensions of thick terms 
are only unified by evaluative similarity relations.   
 
The fundamental disagreement between Hare and McDowell concerns whether the 
shapelessness hypothesis is true.  Is there any reason to accept shapelessness?  This 
hypothesis is sometimes supported by the fact that it can explain why premise (2) of the 
Disentangling Argument is plausible—that is, it can explain why an unsympathetic outsider 
could not master the extension of ‘chaste’ (Roberts 2013: 680).  Of course, this idea won’t 
convince someone like Hare who rejects premise (2).  Something more should be said.  In 
section 5b, further support for shapelessness is discussed. 
 
It is worth noting that there is a common thread running through Hare’s replies to both Foot 
and McDowell.  In both replies Hare claims that there could be a descriptive expression that 
is extensionally equivalent to a thick term.  Without this claim he could not hold that des-
chaste is coextensive with chaste.  He also could not escape Foot’s objection to the is-ought 
gap by claiming that the evaluations of thick terms are detachable.     
 
c. Williams on Ethical Truth 
If successful, McDowell’s argument would show that there could not be a wholly descriptive 
expression coextensive with a thick term.  Furthermore, if we assume that utterances 
involving thick terms are sometimes true, McDowell’s argument might show that there are 
evaluative facts—facts that can only be characterized in evaluative terms. But this is too 
quick.  After all, sentences involving thick terms might only be true in a minimalist sense. 
On the minimalist theory of truth, to say that ‘lying is dishonest’ is true is equivalent to 
saying simply that lying is dishonest. This is all that can be significantly said about the truth 
of this sentence.  Since nothing more can be said, its mere truth does not entail the existence 
of a fact to which the sentence corresponds.  So, even if McDowell’s argument succeeds, the 
truth of sentences involving thick terms does not guarantee that there are facts that can only 
be characterized in evaluative terms.   
 
To get a fuller picture of how the truth of such sentences might support the existence of 
evaluative facts, we must turn to Bernard Williams.  According to Williams, utterances 
involving thick terms show promise of being more than just minimally true, whereas 
utterances involving thin terms do not.  The main difference, according to Williams, is that 
thick terms bear a close connection to the concept of knowledge and to the notion of a 
helpful advisor.   
 
Consider the connection between knowledge and thick concepts.  There is a precedent for 
thinking that certain epistemic difficulties arise for thin concepts but not thick ones.  For 
example, how exactly can one come to know that lying is sometimes wrong?  This plausible 
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truth, which involves a thin concept, seems to be neither analytic nor a posteriori.  Some 
ethicists have thus held that it is synthetic a priori and is knowable by a special faculty of the 
mind, such as moral intuition.  But many ethicists find this view implausible and have instead 
turned to thick concepts for an account of ethical knowledge.  It may seem more plausible 
that we can know a posteriori that a thick concept applies, for example, that a certain action is 
cowardly.  According to Mark Platts, we can know such truths “by looking and seeing,” 
without any special faculty, such as moral intuition (1988: 285).   
 
Williams agrees that thick ethical knowledge is more feasible than thin ethical knowledge. 
His reasons, however, are different from Platts’.  Williams holds that the concept of 
knowledge is associated with the notion of a helpful informant or advisor, and that there are 
only such advisors with regard to the application of thick concepts, not thin ones.  
According to Williams, a helpful advisor is someone who is better than others at seeing that 
a certain outcome, policy, or action falls under a concept.  And Williams holds that there 
are helpful advisors with regard to thick concepts.  For example, the advice that a certain 
action would be cowardly “can offer the person who is being advised a genuine discovery” 
(1993: 217).  Are there helpful advisors with regard to thin concepts?  Not according to 
Williams—“not many people are going to say ‘Well, I didn’t understand the professor’s 
argument for his conclusion that abortion is wrong, but since he is qualified in the subject, 
abortion probably is wrong’” (1995: 235).  Thus, according to Williams, utterances 
involving thick terms show promise of being more than minimally true, given that thick 
terms have this association with knowledge and helpful informants. 
 
Even though Williams holds that utterances involving thick terms can be more than 
minimally true, he does not think these utterances can be objectively true—that is, true 
independently of particular perspectives.  To illustrate this, Williams asks us to compare 
ethics with science.  Although there are disagreements in science, there is at least some 
chance of scientists converging on a perspective-free account of the world, and this 
convergence would be best explained by the correctness of that account.  But Williams 
thinks our ethical opinions stand no chance of converging on an account of how the world 
really is independently of particular perspectives—at any rate, if they do converge, this will 
not be because these opinions have tracked how the world is independently of perspective 
(1985: 135-6).  So, on Williams’ view, the truth of ethical opinions is dependent upon 
perspective, and hence, not objectively true. 
 
How exactly is the truth of utterances involving thick terms dependent upon perspective?  
Williams illustrates his view by asking us to envision a hypertraditional society which is 
maximally homogenous and minimally reflective.  Williams holds that ethical reflection 
primarily employs thin concepts, and that this hypertraditional society is unreflective 
because it only employs thick concepts.  According to Williams, their utterances involving 
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thick terms can be true in their language L, which is distinct from our language since L does 
not express thin concepts whereas our language does.  Williams thinks it is undeniable that 
the thick concepts expressed in L need not be expressible with our language, which means 
that we may be unable to use our language to assert or deny what insiders say with their 
thick terms.  Of course, it is possible for a sympathetic outsider, such as an anthropologist, 
to understand and speak L.  But, according to Williams, the outsider cannot formulate an 
equivalent utterance in his own language because “the expressive powers of his own 
language are different from those of the native language precisely in the respect that the 
native language contains an ethical concept which his doesn’t” (1995: 239).         
 
To explain Williams’ view further, we can borrow an example from Allan Gibbard (1992).  
Imagine that gopa is a positive thick concept expressible in L but not expressible in our 
language.  Although a reflective outsider cannot assert that x is gopa in her own language, 
she can likely reject the proposition that x is good, which involves a thin concept.  And if the 
local’s thick concept gopa entails good, then the outsider could reject the insider’s statement 
as false by denying that x is good.  So, it looks like the insider’s statement can be assessed as 
false from an outside perspective.  However, Williams does not accept that the insider’s 
concept gopa entails good.  A judgment involving a thin concept, such as good, “is essentially 
the product of reflection” which comes about “when someone stands back from the practices 
of the society and its use of the concepts and asks… whether these are good ways in which 
to assess actions…” (1985:146).  But this hypertraditional society is unreflective, which 
means they do not employ the thin concept good.  So, according to Williams, there’s no 
reason to assume that their concept gopa entails good, which means the outsider’s denial that 
x is good poses no clear threat to the truth of ‘x is gopa’. 
 
On Williams’ view, if a person from the hypertraditional society has knowledge that x is 
gopa, but later reflects and draws the conclusion that x is good, this reflection may unseat 
his previous knowledge by making it so that this person no longer possesses the traditional 
concept gopa (1995: 238).  In this way, “rejection can destroy knowledge,” because the one 
who reflects may thereby cease to possess their traditional thick concepts (1985, 148).    
 
Williams has here outlined a possibility in which utterances involving thick terms could be 
true in a way that is dependent upon perspective—in particular, the perspective of a person 
who speaks a certain ethical language, such as L. Opposition to Williams comes from at least 
two fronts.   
 
First, McDowell (1998) and Hilary Putnam (1990) have both objected to Williams’ 
conception of science as providing a perspective-free account of the world.  They hold that 
science is perspective-dependent.  Although this objection would destroy Williams’ contrast 
between science and ethics, it would not mean that ethical truth is perspective-free, but only 
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that science and ethics are both perspective-dependent, which leaves ethics in good 
company.   
 
A second source of opposition is known as Thin Centralism—the view that thin concepts are 
conceptually prior to, and independent of, thick concepts.  If good is conceptually prior to 
gopa, then the locals cannot grasp gopa without also grasping good.  This would mean that 
Williams is wrong to claim that the locals may lose the concept gopa when they draw the 
reflective inference from x is gopa to x is good.  Furthermore, the outsider who denies that 
x is good is required, by way of this inference, to deny that x is gopa.  So, the truth or falsity 
of ‘x is gopa’ would not depend on what is  knowable solely from the local’s perspective, 
contrary to Williams’ view.  It may depend partly on whether x is good, which may be 
discernible from the outsider’s perspective.  
 
Williams rejects Thin Centralism, though he does not give any arguments against it (1995: 
234). He is plausibly a Thick Centralist, holding that thick concepts are conceptually prior 
to, and independent of, thin concepts. That is, one cannot grasp a thin concept without 
grasping some thick concept or other, but not vice versa.  This view can be understood by 
way of a color analogy.  The concept color is a very general concept that, according to Susan 
Hurley, cannot be understood independently of specific color concepts, such as red, green, 
etc. (1989: 16).  And according to Thick Centralism, thin concepts like good cannot be 
grasped independently of specific thick concepts like courageous, kind, and so on.  
 
It might be true that the grasp of color requires the grasp of some specific color concept (for 
example, red), but is the opposite also true?  Does the grasp of red require a grasp of color?  If 
so, then the color analogy would actually support what is known as the No-Priority View—
thick and thin concepts are conceptually interdependent with neither one being prior to the 
other (Dancy 2013).  It is worth noting that the No-Priority View is not available to 
Williams, since this view would mean that the local’s grasp of gopa requires the grasp of a 
thin concept, and this presents the same problem that Thin Centralism presents for 
Williams’ view.   
 
d. Thick Concepts in Normative Ethics 
It is often urged that ethicists should stop focusing as much on thin concepts and should 
expand or shift attention towards the thick (Anscombe 1958; Williams 1985).  As a result, 
there has been much attention paid to thick concepts within meta-ethics, primarily regarding 
the issues discussed above.  Have thick concepts also played a substantive role in normative 
ethics?  They have to some extent.  Normative ethics is partly concerned with the question 
of what kind of person one should be.  And the virtue and vice concepts, which are 
paradigmatic thick concepts, have played a significant role in these discussions.   
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However, normative ethics is also concerned with the question of how one should act, and 
in this context it is common to focus on thin concepts, like right, wrong, and good.  Of 
course, there are some thick concepts, such as just and equitable that figure into these 
discussions, but it is not immediately clear why it would matter whether these concepts are 
thick, rather than thin or purely descriptive. There is at least one attempt at giving thick 
concepts a substantive role in a theory of how to act.  This comes from Rosalind 
Hursthouse’s virtue theory of right action. 
 
Virtue theory is sometimes criticized for being unable to provide a theory of right action. 
The mere fact that virtues are character traits of persons does not mean that virtue concepts 
cannot be applied to actions.  Actions can also be honest, courageous, patient, and so on. 
The problem is that these characterizations of action do not clearly tell us anything about 
rightness, which would be a major flaw of a normative ethical theory.   
 
Hursthouse meets this criticism by providing a theory of right action in terms of virtue.  She 
holds that an action is right just in case it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically do 
in the circumstances (1999: 28).  The virtuous agent is one who has the virtuous character 
traits and exercises them.  And a virtue is a character trait that a human being needs to 
flourish or live well.  These particular virtues must be enumerated, but the list typically 
includes paradigmatic thick terms, such as ‘courage’, ‘honesty’, ‘patience’, ‘generosity’, and 
so on. Hursthouse explicitly claims that the virtue terms are thick (1996: 27).  Does it 
matter for her view whether the virtue terms are thick?  Hursthouse’s theory faces an 
objection, and it is in response to this objection that it might matter.   
 
The objection alleges that the virtue theory of right action cannot provide clear action-
guidance, whereas rival normative theories, such as deontology and utilitarianism, can 
provide clear action-guidance by generating rules, such as “Don’t lie” or “Maximize 
happiness.”  According to this objection, the virtue theory of right action can only generate a 
very unhelpful rule: “Do what a virtuous person would do.”  This rule is not likely to 
provide action-guidance.  If you are a fully virtuous person, you will already know what to 
do and so would not require the rule.  If you are less than fully virtuous, you may have no 
idea what a virtuous person would do in the circumstances, especially if you don’t know of 
anyone who is fully virtuous (indeed, such a person might be purely hypothetical).  So, 
according to this objection, the virtue theory of right action cannot provide action-guidance. 
 
In response, Hursthouse points out that every virtue generates positive instruction on how 
to act—do what is honest, charitable, generous, and so on.  And every vice generates a 
prohibition—do not do what is dishonest, uncharitable, mean, and so on (1999: 36).  So, 
one can get action-guidance without reflecting on what a hypothetical virtuous agent would 
do in the circumstances.  According to Hursthouse, “the agent may employ her concepts of 
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the virtues and vices directly, rather than imagining what some hypothetical exemplar would 
do” (1991: 227).  For example, the agent may reason “I must not tell this lie, since it would 
be dishonest.”  And since dishonesty is a vice, which no virtuous person would have, this 
agent will be directed towards right action.   
 
Thus, it’s important for Hursthouse’s view that the virtue concepts are at least action-
guiding.  After all, imagine that the virtue concepts were wholly descriptive concepts of 
character traits, like slow, calm, or quiet.  These descriptive concepts would not generate any 
prohibitions or positive instruction.   
 
Does it matter whether the virtue concepts are thick rather than thin concepts?  Hursthouse 
does not speak directly to this question, though she does claim that, if we are unclear on 
what to do in a circumstance, we can seek advice from people who are morally better than 
ourselves (1999: 35).  And, here, Williams’ point about helpful advisors might be useful.  If 
the virtue concepts were thin, then on Williams’ view there would be no helpful advisor 
with regard to whether the virtue concepts apply.  But such advice is possible if the virtue 
concepts are thick.  In short, it is important for Hursthouse that the virtue concepts are 
action-guiding.  And, if Williams is right, it may also matter whether the virtue concepts are 
thick. 
 
One potential challenge to Hursthouse’s reply might contest the traditional list of virtues, 
and claim that there is no reason to think this list, when properly enumerated, will contain 
thick action-guiding concepts.  For example, why should we think that courageous will be on 
the list of virtues rather than a similar concept that rarely generates positive instruction (for 
example, gutsy)?  In considering this objection, readers are advised to consult Hursthouse’s 
approach to enumerating the virtues (1999: Ch. 8).   
 
Another potential challenge may come from Thin Centralism.  Suppose that right is 
conceptually prior to, and independent of, courageous.  In this case, it might be argued that 
the positive instruction generated by courage (for example, “Do what is courageous”) is 
wholly due to the action-guidingness of right.  The latter is precisely what we wanted to 
explain, which means that Hursthouse’s reply might be uninformative.  However, 
Hursthouse does not account for particular virtue concepts in terms of right. Furthermore, 
even if Thin Centralism is true, it could still be claimed that some other thin concept, such 
as good, is conceptually prior to thick virtue concepts.  So, Hursthouse’s account cannot be 





Published in Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2016) 
16 
 
3. How Do Thick Concepts Combine Evaluation and Description? 
Thin Centralists typically accept Reductive Views of the thick, which aim to analyze the 
meanings of thick terms by citing more fundamental concepts (for example, thin concepts 
and descriptive concepts).  Proponents of these Reductive Views often aim at escaping the 
Disentangling Argument.  In particular, they aim to reject premise (1) of that argument by 
showing that Reductive Views can consistently claim that an outsider could not grasp the 
extension of a thick term.  This strategy proceeds by providing different versions of the 
Reductive View, which shall be discussed below.   
 
It is worth noting that Reductive Views are typically neutral on whether the weak or strong 
distinction ought to be accepted.  They also tend to be neutral on whether cognitivism or 
non-cognitivism is true. To be sure, Reductivism is often associated with non-cognitivists, 
like Hare, but there are some traditional cognitivists, like Henry Sidgwick and G.E. Moore, 
who hold Reductive Views of the thick (Hurka 2011: 7).   
 
Those who reject Thin Centralism and accept the Disentangling Argument normally accept 
Non-Reductive Views, holding that the meanings of thick terms are evaluative and 
descriptive in some sense, though cannot be divided into distinct contents.  The basic 
disagreement between Reductive and Non-Reductive views is on whether thick concepts are 
fundamental evaluative concepts or are complexes built up from more fundamental concepts 
(for example, thin concepts).  These two approaches are compared in the following 
sections.  
 
a. Reductive Views 
In general, Reductive Views understand the meaning of a thick term as the combination of a 
descriptive content with an evaluative content.  Different Reductive Views can be 
distinguished based on how they specify this general account.  There are three main types of 
Reductive Views: (i) some views specify the sort of descriptive content within the analysis; 
(ii) some views specify the relation between evaluative and descriptive contents; and (iii) 
other views specify what the evaluative content is.  There are also various ways of combining 
(i)-(iii).   
 
Consider type (i) first.  Daniel Elstein and Thomas Hurka provide two patterns of analysis 
that explain the descriptive content of a thick term in two different ways.  On their first 
pattern of analysis, the descriptive content of a thick term is not fully specified within the 
meaning of the thick term.  The meaning of the thick term may only specify that there are 
some good-making descriptive properties of a general type, without specifying exactly what 
these good-making properties are.  For example, on their view, ‘x is just’ means ‘x is good, 
and there are properties XYZ (not specified) that distributions have as distributions, such 
that x has XYZ and XYZ make any distribution that has them good’.  Elstein and Hurka hold 
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that this kind of Reductive View is not a Strong Reductive View, because the thick concept 
does not  have a fully specified descriptive content that determines the thick concept’s 
extension.  Still, their view is available to non-cognitivists who accept the strong distinction. 
Most importantly, Elstein and Hurka believe their view allows non-cognitivists to claim that 
an outsider could not grasp the extension of ‘just’.  Grasping that extension requires 
determining which properties of the general type are the good-making ones, and doing this 
requires evaluative judgments that the outsider is not equipped to make (2009: 521-2). 
 
Elstein and Hurka’s second pattern of analysis involves an additional evaluation, which is 
embedded within the descriptive content.  Many virtue and vice concepts are supposed to fit 
into this second pattern of analysis.  For example, on their view, ‘an act x is courageous’ 
means roughly ‘x is good, and x involves an agent’s accepting risk of harm for himself for 
the sake of goods greater than the evil of that harm, where this property makes any act that 
has it good’ (2009: 527).  The reference to goods is an embedded evaluation, and it is 
impossible to determine the extension of ‘courageous’ without determining what can count 
as goods—but determining this requires an evaluation which the outsider is not equipped to 
make (2009: 526).   
 
Stephen Burton offers an account of type (ii) by clarifying the relationship between 
descriptive and evaluative contents of a thick concept.  A simple way of expressing the 
relationship between a thick term’s evaluative and descriptive contents is as follows: ‘x is D 
and therefore x is E’, where D is a description and E is an evaluation that follows from that 
description.  The trouble is that this simple formula entails that D is coextensive with the 
thick term itself, and this makes the simple formula vulnerable to the Disentangling 
Argument.  So, Burton modifies the account so that the thick term is not coextensive with 
D.  Burton proposes that a thick term’s meaning can be analyzed as follows: ‘x is E in virtue 
of some particular instance of D’.  For example, ‘courageous’ means ‘(pro tanto) good in 
virtue of some particular instance of sticking to one’s guns despite great personal risk’.  
Here, the thick term only groups together those cases in which a thing is E in virtue of some 
particular instance of D.  But D does not entail E, and so is not coextensive with the thick 
term.  Thus, an outsider’s ability to track D will not  be enough for her to track the insider’s 
use of the thick term.  But what does it mean for E to depend upon a particular instance of 
D?  For Burton, this means that E “depends on the various different characteristics and 
contexts” of D, and so D alone is not sufficient for E.  Various different characteristics and 
contexts, which are not encoded in the meaning of the thick term, also need to obtain 
(1992: 31).     
 
Now consider a view of type (iii).  Most Reductive Views hold that thick concepts inherit 
their evaluative-ness from a constituent thin concept.  However, Christine Tappolet 
proposes that they are instead evaluative on account of specific affective concepts, like 
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admirable, pleasant, desirable, and amusing.  These concepts are not thin concepts, but 
Tappolet holds that they are the basic evaluative constituents of thick concepts, like 
courageous and generous.  For example, Tappolet’s analysis of courageous goes like this: ‘x is 
courageous’ means ‘x is D and x is admirable in virtue of this particular instance of D’, 
where D is a description.  Essentially, Tappolet accepts Burton’s account of the relation 
between descriptive and evaluative contents, but modifies the account so that it incorporates 
affective concepts instead of thin concepts.  In doing so, she parts company with other 
Reductivists by rejecting Thin Centralism.  She rejects Thin Centralism because she holds 
that understanding a thin concept, such as good, requires an understanding of certain specific 
concepts such as pleasant and admirable (2004: 216).   
 
An objection may arise: affective concepts are also thick concepts, but they do not fit into 
Tappolet’s analyses of thick concepts. This is because one affective concept, such as 
admirable, cannot be defined in terms of another, such as pleasant.  How then should we 
account for these affective concepts?  Tappolet’s answer is that affective concepts are to be 
treated differently from other thick concepts, like courageous.  In particular, she treats 
positive affective concepts as determinates of the determinable good, and she holds that 
determinates cannot be analyzed in terms of their determinables.  Roughly, the 
determinable/determinate relation is a relation of general concepts to more specific ones, 
where the general determinables are common to each specific determinate, but there is 
nothing distinguishing the determinates from each other except for the determinates 
themselves—for example, the only thing that distinguishes red from other colors is redness 
itself. 
 
Edward Harcourt and Alan Thomas (2013) have pointed to a tension between Tappolet’s 
treatment of affective concepts and her treatment of other thick concepts.  What reason is 
there to think courageous is analyzable but not admirable?  Tappolet holds that admirable is 
unanalyzable because there is no way of stating the relevant descriptive content associated 
with admirable (2004: 217). In response, Harcourt and Thomas claim that this is just as much 
a problem for her analyses of other thick concepts.  For example, it is far from clear what 
should be substituted for ‘D’ within Tappolet’s analysis of courageous.  This objection leads 
Harcourt and Thomas to a Non-Reductive View, according to which all thick concepts are 
treated as determinates of thin concepts like good and bad (2013: 25-9).     
 
One problem is that there is reason to think that both parties to this dispute are mistaken in 
claiming that affective concepts cannot be analyzed.  There is a simple Reductive account of 
the meaning of ‘admirable’, which is not represented by any of the above views—
‘admirable’ just means ‘worthy of admiration’.  Similar accounts can be given for other 
affective concepts.  If this simple analysis is correct, then Tappolet and Harcourt and 
Thomas are mistaken about the unanalyzability of thick affective concepts.   




Some of the analyses provided above may not withstand potential counterexamples.  But it is 
worth pointing out that our inability to state an adequate analysis for a given thick term does 
not show that its meaning is unanalyzable.  Analyses can only be attempted by using a 
language, and it is possible that our language’s vocabulary does not contain the expressions 
needed for providing an adequate analysis of the thick term’s meaning.  Reductive Views are 
only committed to the view that the meanings of thick terms involve appropriately related 
evaluative and descriptive contents; they are not committed to there being any actual 
language that can express these contents in a way that counts as a satisfactory analysis.   
 
What then is the point in providing these patterns of analysis?  The point is to illustrate the 
general ways in which descriptive and evaluative contents can be combined within the 
meanings of thick terms.  Typically, Reductive Views only commit to the possibility of there 
being a certain general type of analysis and do not commit to the particular details of their 
sample analyses (for example, Elstein and Hurka, 2009: 531).   
 
Are there any advantages to Reductivism about the thick?  According to Hurka, Reductivism 
allows cognitivists to explain the difference between virtues and their cognate vices (2011: 
7).  For example, both courage and foolhardiness involve a willingness to face risk for a 
cause.  What then differentiates courage from foolhardiness?  It is plausible that courage 
requires that the cause be good enough to justify the risk, whereas foolhardiness does not 
require this.  This explanation appeals to a thin concept—good—that many Reductivists are 
perfectly willing to cite as a constituent of courage.  However, there is nothing forbidding 
Non-Reductivists from also claiming that courage requires a good enough cause, provided 
they don not take this content to be a constituent of courage.  So, this may be no clear 
advantage for Reductivism. 
 
Another potential advantage is that Reductivism allows us to explain a wide variety of 
evaluative concepts by recognizing only a few basic ones, such as ought or good.  Moreover, if 
a successful analysis can be achieved, then Non-Reductivists are committed to positing two 
meanings where Reductivists can posit only one.  For example, if the meaning of 
‘admirable’ can be analyzed with ‘worthy of admiration’, then Reductivists can claim that 
the meanings of these two expressions are identical, whereas Non-Reductivists must hold 
that these meanings are distinct.  Lastly, Reductive Views can explain how a thick term is 
both evaluative and descriptive, since the evaluative-ness of a thick term’s meaning is 
inherited from a constituent content that is paradigmatically evaluative (for example, a thin 
concept); and the descriptiveness of its meaning is inherited from a constituent descriptive 
content.  In the next section, we shall examine whether Non-Reductivists can provide a 
comparable explanation. 
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b. Non-Reductive Views 
Non-Reductive Views hold that the meanings of thick terms are both descriptive and 
evaluative, although these features are not due to constituent contents within the meanings 
of thick terms.  In slogan form, thick concepts are irreducibly thick.  For example, the thick 
term ‘brutal’ expresses a sui generis evaluative concept, which is not a combination of bad or 
wrong along with some descriptive content.  The challenge is for Non-Reductive Views to 
explain how these meanings are both evaluative and descriptive.  As noted, Reductive Views 
explain this in terms of constituent contents.  The challenge is for Non-Reductive Views to 
explain how the meanings of thick terms are both descriptive and evaluative without 
appealing to constituent contents.   
 
This challenge should be weakened in light of the fact that our notions of the descriptive and 
the evaluative are theoretically-loaded.  Non-Reductive theorists do not accept the strong 
distinction between description and evaluation, because they hold that thick terms are both 
evaluative and capable of picking out properties.  The strong distinction precludes this 
possibility, unless the content of the thick term is built up from constituents, which Non-
Reductivists reject.  Non-Reductivists typically accept some version of the weak distinction, 
but the present challenge cannot be framed in terms of this distinction.  On the weak 
distinction, the descriptive is identical to the non-evaluative. This means that Non-
Reductivists are being asked to explain how the meanings of thick terms are both evaluative 
and not evaluative, which is plainly contradictory.  How then are we to understand the 
challenge faced by Non-Reductive Views?   
 
The challenge can be framed in a two-fold way: (I) Non-Reductive Views need to explain 
what the meanings of thick terms have in common with the meanings of thin terms—this 
would explain the evaluative-ness of the thick term’s meaning.  And (II) they also need to 
explain what the meanings of thick terms have in common with the meanings of 
paradigmatic descriptive terms—this would explain the descriptiveness of the thick term’s 
meaning.   
 
Starting with (I),  Jonathan Dancy holds that both thick and thin terms express concepts that 
have “practical relevance,” a feature that is lacked by descriptive concepts.  To see what he 
means, consider how thick and thin concepts differ from descriptive concepts like water.  
The latter can make a practical difference in some circumstances: water may be something 
to seek when stranded in a desert.  But in this case, we must explain the practical relevance 
of water by citing other properties in the particular situation, such as being thirsty, in a 
desert, and so forth.  By contrast, there is nothing to be explained when a thick or thin 
concept makes a practical difference, since their practical relevance “is to be expected.”  For 
example, it is expected that courage is something to aspire for and admire, and this does not  
require explanation by citing other concepts.  Dancy expands upon this by claiming that 
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competence with a thick concept requires not only an ability to determine when the concept 
applies, but also an ability to determine what practical relevance its application has in the 
circumstances.  Competence with a descriptive concept requires only the former, not the 
latter (2013: 56).   
 
At this point, Reductive theorists may emphasize a potential benefit of their view—they 
have a simple explanation for why competence with a thick concept requires an ability to 
determine its practical relevance.  In particular, competence with a thick concept requires 
an ability to determine its practical relevance because its constituent thin concept is 
practically relevant.  But Dancy and other Non-Reductivists cannot appeal to this 
explanation.  How then can they explain the practical relevance of thick concepts?   
 
Conceptual competence can surely be explained without appealing to constituent concepts, 
otherwise competence with a simple concept would be inexplicable.  One potential 
explanation, which does not appeal to constituent concepts, comes from Harcourt and 
Thomas (2013: 24-7).  Harcourt and Thomas hold that thick concepts are related to good 
and bad analogously to how red is related to colored.  On their view, colored is not a 
constituent of red, since there are no other concepts that can be combined with colored to 
yield red.  Instead, red is a determinate of the determinable color.  Similarly, the thin concept 
bad is not a constituent of the thick concept brutal—according to Harcourt and Thomas, 
there is no other concept that can be combined with bad to yield brutal.  Instead, brutal is a 
determinate of the determinable bad.  Moreover, given that brutal is a determinate of bad, it 
can be claimed that the practical relevance of brutal is inherited from the practical relevance 
of bad, even though the latter is not a constituent of the former.             
 
Debbie Roberts provides another explanation of what the meanings of thick terms have in 
common with thin terms.  Many ethicists claim that thick and thin terms express and induce 
attitudes, or condemn, commend, and instruct. Roberts takes a different approach.  On her 
view, a concept is evaluative in virtue of ascribing an evaluative property.  A concept 
ascribes a property if and only if the real definition of the property it refers to is given by the 
content of that concept.  What then is an evaluative property?  According to Roberts, a 
property P is evaluative if (i) P is intrinsically linked to human concerns and purposes; (ii) 
there are various lower-level properties that can each make it the case that P is instantiated 
(that is, P is multiply-realizable); but (iii) these lower-level properties do not necessitate 
that P is instantiated (that is, other features must also obtain).  Roberts holds that both thick 
and thin concepts ascribe properties that satisfy (i)-(iii) (2013). 
 
One potential problem is that there might be some paradigmatically descriptive properties 
that satisfy (i)-(iii).  Consider a particular mental state with moral content, such as the belief 
that lying is wrong.  The property of being in this state is intrinsically linked to human 
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concerns and purposes, since it is a moral belief.  And if belief-states are multiply realizable, 
then this property will satisfy (ii) as well.  And finally, if there are lower-level brain states 
that make it the case that someone has this belief, without necessitating it, then (iii) will be 
satisfied as well.  Thus, certain mental properties may satisfy (i)-(iii), even though they seem 
descriptive. Roberts could reply by holding that the above-mentioned moral belief is not 
linked to human concerns and purposes in the right sort of way.         
 
Turning to (II): What do the meanings of thick terms have in common with paradigmatic 
descriptive terms?  Recall that a key point about paradigmatic descriptive terms is that these 
terms are capable of representing properties. Non-Reductive theorists can point out that 
thick terms also seem capable of representing properties.  This, in fact, was the fundamental 
motivation for focusing on thick terms to begin with.  And nearly all ethicists (except for 
Ayer) would agree that this is true.  It plainly seems true that ‘courage’ is capable of picking 
out a property, and in this way ‘courage’ shares something in common with paradigmatic 
descriptive terms like ‘red’ and ‘water’.   
 
Another key point about descriptive terms is that they are intuitively different from thin 
terms like ‘wrong’ and ‘good’.  Indeed, a central motivation for classifying terms as 
descriptive is to exclude thin terms like ‘good’ and ‘wrong’ from paradigmatically 
descriptive expressions.  How then do thick terms share this feature with the descriptive—
that of being different from thin terms?  There are two general answers that Non-
Reductivists provide.  On one approach, thick and thin differ in kind.  On the other, thick 
and thin differ only in degree but not in kind.  These general approaches are discussed in the 
next section.  Reductivist theories are also discussed under each approach. 
 
 
4. How Do Thick and Thin Differ? 
 
a. In Kind: Williams’ View   
Williams is a Non-Reductive theorist who holds that thick and thin differ in kind.  On his 
view, thick terms are both world-guided and action-guiding.  For Williams, a world-guided 
term is one whose usage is “controlled by the facts”—that is, there are conditions for its 
correct application and competent users can largely agree that it does or does not apply in 
new situations.  An action-guiding term is one that is “characteristically related to reasons 
for action” (1985: 140-1).  For Williams, thick terms are both world-guided and action-
guiding, whereas thin terms are action-guiding but “do not display world-guidedness” (1985: 
152).   
 
There are some potential problems for Williams’ distinction.  First, Williams’ claim that 
thin terms “do not display world-guidedness” seems to commit him to something 
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controversial—namely, that non-cognitivism is true of thin terms.  Other Non-Reductivists 
accept Williams’ characterization of thick terms, but hold that thin terms are also world-
guided and action-guiding (Dancy 2013: 56).  If they are right then Williams’ distinction 
between thick and thin is compromised.   
 
Nevertheless, there is a straightforward way of distinguishing between thick and thin, which 
does not assume non-cognitivism about thin terms.  On this view, thin terms express wholly 
evaluative concepts, whereas thick terms express concepts that are partly evaluative and 
partly descriptive.  This straightforward distinction gives us a difference in kind between 
thick and thin.  The trouble is that it too appears to be theoretically loaded (much like 
Williams’ distinction).  This straightforward distinction presupposes a Reductive View, 
since it holds that thick concepts are built up from evaluative and descriptive components.  
Another potential problem is that it is not clear whether thin concepts are wholly evaluative.  
For example, it looks as though the thin concept ought implies the descriptive concept can, 
assuming the ought-implies-can principle (Väyrynen 2013: 7).  Of course, as Dancy points 
out, the mere fact that one concept entails another does not mean that the latter is a 
constituent of the former—cow entails not-a-horse, but neither is a constituent of the other 
(2013: 49).  
 
A second potential problem for Williams’ view, and the straightforward view just 
mentioned, comes from Samuel Scheffler.  Scheffler points out that there are many 
evaluative terms that are hard to classify as either thick or thin.  Consider ‘just’, ‘fair’, 
‘impartial’, ‘rights’, ‘autonomy’, and ‘consent’.  Upon reflecting on such concepts, 
Scheffler suggests that world-guidedness is a matter of degree and that a division of ethical 
concepts into thick and thin is a “considerable oversimplification” (1987: 417-8).   
 
In a later essay, Williams replies to Scheffler by agreeing that thickness comes in degrees, 
and that “there is an important class of concepts that lie between the thick and the thin” 
(1995: 234).  This reply, however, does not entail that Williams must reject his earlier 
view.   Assume that thickness and thinness each come in degrees, and that thick and thin do 
not exhaust all evaluative concepts.  These two claims do not entail that the difference 
between thick and thin is merely a matter of degree.  This can be seen via analogy: belief 
that P and disbelief that P are exclusive categories that each come in degree, and which do 
not exhaust all doxastic states since suspension of judgment is also possible.  But the 
difference between belief that P and disbelief that P is not merely a matter of degree.  These 
states are different in kind, assuming the former is about the affirmative proposition P while 
the latter is about the negation ¬P.  Similarly, thick and thin could also differ in kind, even if 
they are exclusive degree categories that do not exhaust all evaluative concepts.  Thus, 
Scheffler’s considerations and Williams’ concessions do not entail that Williams’ earlier 
view is false. 





b. Only in Degree: The Continuum View 
Still, many theorists have seized upon Scheffler’s point and have claimed that thick and thin 
differ only in degree, not in kind.  Some consider this to be the standard view (Väyrynen 
2008: 391).  On this view, thin and thick lie on opposite ends of a continuum of evaluative 
concepts, with no sharp dividing line between them.  For example, good and bad might lie on 
one end of the continuum, with kind, compassionate, and cruel on the other end.  There are at 
least two gradable notions that can serve to distinguish the ends of this continuum—degrees 
of specificity or amounts of descriptive content.  Greater specificity, or greater amounts of 
descriptive content, provides a thicker concept with a narrower range of application.  Non-
Reductive theorists typically focus on the greater specificity of thick terms.  Reductive 
theorists can choose either path; indeed, they can explain the greater specificity of a thick 
concept in terms of how much descriptive content it has as a constituent.  In general, a 
concept must have enough specificity, or enough descriptive content, for it to reside on the 
thicker end of the continuum.   
 
Support for the continuum view may come from several considerations.  First, consider that 
some thin concepts have narrower ranges of application than other thin concepts. For 
example, good can apply to actions, people, food, cars, and so on, whereas right cannot apply 
to all these things.  This may suggest that there are degrees of thinness.  Second, as already 
noted, some thin concepts have descriptive entailments—for instance, the thin concept 
ought entails the descriptive concept can.  Even if can is not a constituent of ought, this 
entailment at least narrows down the range of application for ought, which could bring it 
closer to the thick end of the spectrum, even if it is still fairly thin.  Thirdly, there seems to 
be a vague area between thick and thin—for example, it is not clear whether just has enough 
specificity or enough descriptive content for it to count as thick, but it is also hard to classify 
this concept as thin.  So, perhaps just is a borderline case between thick and thin. 
 
Given these considerations, one may be tempted to hold that thick and thin do not differ in 
kind.  But the above considerations do not strictly entail this.  Again, analogous 
considerations hold for both belief and disbelief—some beliefs have narrower ranges of 
application than other beliefs (for example, rabbits cannot have complex mathematical 
beliefs though they can have perceptual beliefs).There is also a vague area between belief and 
disbelief, yet these two doxastic states differ in kind.  So, these considerations only seem to 
support the Continuum View if there is no way of drawing a distinction in kind.  But Hare 
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c. In Kind: Hare’s View 
Hare is a Reductivist who holds that thick and thin are distinct in kind, not merely in degree.  
He holds that thick terms have both descriptive and evaluative meanings associated with 
them.  Interestingly, Hare holds that this is also true of thin terms.  Thus, for Hare, thin 
terms are not wholly evaluative, contrary to the straightforward view mentioned in 4a.   
 
What then is the difference between thick and thin?  The difference has to do with the 
relationship that the two meanings bear to the term in question.  A thin term is one whose 
evaluative meaning is “more firmly attached” to it than its descriptive meaning.  And a thick 
term is one whose descriptive meaning is “more firmly attached” than its evaluative meaning 
(1963: 24-5).  Although Hare agrees that being firmly attached is “only a matter of 
probability and degree” (1989: 125), this does not mean that the distinction between thick 
and thin is only a matter of degree.  Indeed, Hare’s phrase “more firmly attached” actually 
marks out a difference in kind.  Consider an analogy: a child who is more firmly attached to 
her mother than to her father is different in kind from a child who is more firmly attached to 
her father than to her mother.  Both are different in kind from a child who is equally 
attached to both parents.  So, the language that Hare uses actually suggests three possible 
categories of evaluative terms—thick, thin, and neither.  Although Hare never mentions the 
third category, it is at least a potential category for Scheffler’s examples of the neither thick 
nor thin.   
 
What does Hare mean by “more firmly attached”?  For Hare, the more firmly attached 
meaning is the one that is less likely to change when language users alter their usage of the 
term.  For example, it is less likely that ‘right’ will eventually be used to evaluate actions 
negatively (or neutrally) than that it will be used to describe lying, promise-breaking, 
killing, torture, and so forth.  The reason is that, if we start using ‘right’ to evaluate actions 
negatively (or neutrally), there is a great chance that we will be misunderstood or accused of 
misusing the word.  In this sense, the evaluative meaning of ‘right’ is more firmly attached 
than its descriptive meaning.  But just the opposite is the case for thick terms like 
‘generous’.  If we start using ‘generous’ to evaluate actions negatively, we will not be 
misunderstood (for example, Ebenezer Scrooge could use ‘generous’ negatively and we 
would still understand him).  Yet, if we started using ‘generous’ to describe selfish acts, for 
example, then we will be misunderstood or accused of misusing the term.  In this sense, the 
descriptive meaning of ‘generous’ is more firmly attached than its evaluative meaning (1989: 
125).     
 
Hare frames his distinction in terms of descriptive and evaluative meanings, which assumes a 
Reductive View.  But his distinction and thought experiment can be formulated without 
assuming a Reductive View.  Rather than talking about descriptive and evaluative meanings, 
we could instead speak of two different speech acts—describing and evaluating—that are 
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commonly performed through ordinary uses of the terms.  Hare’s thought experiment can 
be formulated by changing the speech acts that we typically perform with the term.  For 
example, although we ordinarily use ‘generous’ to perform a speech act of positive 
evaluation, a speaker who uses it to evaluate negatively would still be understood.     
 
Thick concepts are evaluative concepts that are substantially descriptive.  Thin concepts, by 
contrast, are not substantially descriptive.  Exactly what ‘substantially descriptive’ means 
can now be clarified, depending on which of the above three views is accepted.  On 
Williams’ view, being substantially descriptive is matter of being world-guided.  On the 
Continuum View, being substantially descriptive is a matter of having enough specificity or 
enough descriptive content.  On Hare’s view, being substantially descriptive is a matter of 
having a descriptive meaning that is more firmly attached than its evaluative meaning.    
 
 
5. Are Thick Terms Truth-Conditionally Evaluative? 
The putative significance of the thick depends upon a crucial assumption about how thick 
terms are evaluative.  Several of the arguments and hypotheses discussed in 2.a-c assume 
that thick terms are evaluative as a matter of truth-conditions—that is, the conditions that 
must obtain for utterances involving thick terms to express true propositions.   
 
To see how this assumption is made, first recall Foot’s argument.  If ‘x is rude’ were not 
evaluative as a matter of truth-conditions, then its truth would not require anything 
evaluative, and there would not be anything evaluative following from the purely descriptive 
claim that x causes offense by indicating lack of respect. Hare’s response, that the evaluation 
of ‘rude’ is detachable, is a denial of the assumption that ‘rude’ is evaluative in its truth-
conditions.  Consider McDowell’s premise (2) of the Disentangling Argument.  It’s often 
assumed that the only reason an outsider could not master the extension of ‘chaste’ must be 
that the truth-conditions associated with ‘chaste’ incorporate something evaluative, which 
the outsider cannot track.  Moreover, the shapelessness hypothesis states that the extensions 
of thick terms are only unified by evaluative similarity relations. This suggests that 
something evaluative must obtain for utterances involving thick terms to express true 
propositions. 
 
Nevertheless, it is controversial that thick terms are evaluative as a matter of truth-
conditions.  Generally, ethicists agree that thick terms are somehow associated with 
evaluative contents, but not all agree that these contents are part of the truth-conditions of 
utterances involving thick terms.  How else can a thick term be associated with evaluative 
content, if not by way of truth-conditions?   
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Our use of language can communicate lots of information that is not part of the truth-
conditions of what we say.  In each of the following cases, a speaker B communicates a 
proposition that is not part of the truth-conditions of B’s utterance.  In this first example, 
the proposition is communicated by way of presupposition:   
 
B: “I don’t regret going to the party.” 
Presupposition: that B went to the party. 
 
Plausibly, B’s utterance could express a true proposition even if its presupposition is false—
one way to have no regrets about going to a party is by simply not going. This 
presupposition can plausibly be a part of the background of the conversation at hand, but not 
part of the truth-conditions of B’s utterance.   
 
Now consider a slightly different example, involving a phone conversation between A and B.  
In this case, B communicates a proposition by way of conversational implicature:   
 
A: “Is Bob there?” 
B: “He’s in the shower.” 
Conversational Implicature: that Bob cannot talk on the phone right now. 
 
This proposition is not part of the truth-conditions of B’s utterance—it is obviously possible 
that Bob can talk on the phone while in the shower.  Instead, this proposition is inferred 
from B’s utterance by relying on conversational maxims and observations from context (for 
example, that A and B are having a phone conversation, and that B would not provide 
irrelevant information about Bob’s showering unless he is trying to convey that Bob cannot 
talk).   
 
Now consider a third example, where B communicates a proposition by way of conventional 
implicature:   
 
B: “Sue is British but brave.” 
Conventional Implicature: that Sue’s bravery is unexpected given that she is British. 
 
The proposition communicated in this example is not part of the truth-conditions of B’s 
utterance.  One way to see this is by comparing B’s utterance with “Sue is British and 
brave.”  These two utterances would seem to be true in all the same circumstances.  But the 
latter does not communicate the implicature in question.  This implicature is detachable, in 
the sense that a truth-conditionally equivalent statement need not have the implicature in 
question.  Although Hare does not mention conventional implicature, his view about the 
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detachability of a thick term’s evaluation could be explained in terms of conventional 
implicature. 
 
In short, there are many ways to communicate information without it being part of the 
truth-conditions of the utterance.  There are three widely-discussed pragmatic 
mechanisms—presupposition, conversational implicature, and conventional implicature—
and there are others as well.  Some hold that utterances involving thick terms do not convey 
evaluations that are part of their truth-conditions, but instead convey them via some 
pragmatic mechanism.  This view is known as the Pragmatic View.  It should be noted that 
some proponents of the Pragmatic View write as though their view entails that there are no 
thick concepts (Blackburn 1992).  In other words, if the only evaluation associated with 
courage is pragmatically associated with it, then these philosophers will say that courage is not 
really a thick concept.  Still, others who accept the Pragmatic View are happy to talk of 
these concepts as thick (Väyrynen 2013).  This article  does so as well. 
 
The traditional view, however, is that thick terms are evaluative as a matter of their truth-
conditions—this view is known as the Semantic View.  The follow two sections discuss the 
Pragmatic and Semantic View, respectively.  
 
a. Pragmatic View 
Sometimes the Pragmatic View is supported by the idea that thick terms are variable in what 
evaluations they express.  Typically, a given thick term conveys a particular evaluation that 
is either positive or negative, but not both. It is natural to assume that the term conveys this 
evaluation (whichever it is) in all assertive contexts.  But it turns out that many paradigmatic 
thick terms can be used to evaluate something negatively in some contexts while positively 
in others.  There are two ways of illustrating this variability. 
 
The first involves combining a thick term with comparative constructions, such as ‘too’ or 
‘not…enough’.  For example, ‘lewd’ is typically negative, but it appears to convey 
something positive in the following quote: “this year’s carnival was not lewd enough” 
(Blackburn 1992: 296).  Similarly, ‘tidy’ is typically positive, but can be used to convey 
something negative if one is criticized as “too tidy” (Hare 1952: 121).  These considerations 
may be taken to show that thick terms are not evaluative as a matter of truth-conditions—if 
these thick terms have an evaluation as part of their truth-conditions, one might think ‘not 
lewd enough’ and ‘too tidy’ should be semantically awkward, but they are not.   
 
Opponents to this argument may claim that the atypical evaluation in each case can be 
explained solely by reference to ‘too’ and ‘not… enough’, without claiming that ‘lewd’ and 
‘tidy’ express an atypical evaluation. Consider that ‘too F’ and ‘not F enough’ are evaluative 
even when F is a wholly non-evaluative expression—for example, one might say that a color 
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sample is too red, which seems to characterize the sample negatively.  Here, the negative 
evaluation is solely because of ‘too’, and so it should be no surprise if this word generates a 
negative evaluation when combined with ‘tidy’.  Furthermore, there are contexts where F is 
clearly seen as a positive quality even when it is  combined with ‘too’.  Borrowing an 
example from Väyrynen, a military commander could count a soldier as too courageous to 
waste on a simple mission, and instead select him for a more formidable mission where his 
courage would be needed (2011: 7).  Thus, it appears the atypical evaluation can be 
attributed to the modifiers ‘too’ and ‘not…enough’ rather than the thick term itself.     
 
The second sort of example pertains to utterances that convey an atypical evaluation without 
employing a comparative construction.  For example, even though ‘cruel’ typically conveys 
a negative evaluation, it might be that the cruelty of an action was “just what made it such 
fun” (Hare 1981: 73).  Or, even though ‘frugal’ typically conveys a positive evaluation, a 
person could be condemned as frugal if his “main job is dispensing hospitality” (Blackburn 
1992: 286).   
 
A worry associated with examples of this second sort is that the atypical evaluation can be 
explained in ways that are consistent with the Semantic View.  For instance, it might be 
claimed that the examples involve non-literal uses of the thick term, or that they only 
convey the alternative evaluation by way of speaker meaning, and not word meaning.  
Alternatively, one could hold that thick terms are context sensitive, and that there are 
several different evaluations conveyed by the thick term depending on the context of 
utterance.  In this case, the thick term would be evaluative as a matter of truth-conditions 
—it is just that those truth-conditions incorporate different evaluations in different contexts 
(Väyrynen 2011: 8-14).       
 
Another argument for the Pragmatic View comes from Pekka Väyrynen (2013), who 
focuses on objectionable thick terms.  Recall that objectionable thick terms embody values 
that ought to be rejected.  Potential examples include ‘lewd’, ‘perverse’, and 
‘blasphemous’, and ‘chaste’.  The last of these terms seems to embody the view that a 
certain kind of sexual restraint is praiseworthy. Those that reject this view regard ‘chaste’ as 
objectionable—one can refer to such individuals as chastity-objectors.  Chastity-objectors 
tend to exhibit interesting linguistic behavior.  They would obviously be reluctant to assert 
that, say, John is chaste; but they are also reluctant to utter non-affirmative sentences like 
the following: 
   (a) John is not chaste. 
(b) Is John chaste? 
(c) Possibly, John is chaste. 
(d) If John is chaste, then so is Mary. 
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None of these utterances imply that the truth-conditions of ‘chaste’ are satisfied.  So, if 
chastity-objectors are reluctant to utter (a-d), this leads us to expect that the evaluation 
projects outside of the truth-conditions of ‘chaste’.  It is worth noting that this argument is 
not restricted to examples like ‘chaste’, ‘perverse’, ‘lewd’, and ‘blasphemous’.  According 
to Väyrynen, virtually any thick term could be regarded as objectionable, at least in 
principle, which means that his argument should extend even to examples like ‘courageous’ 
and ‘murder’.   
 
In addition to arguing against the Semantic View, proponents of the Pragmatic View need to 
explain what pragmatic mechanism is responsible for the evaluations of thick terms.  The 
three pragmatic mechanisms cited above can provide potential explanations, but Väyrynen 
rejects these explanations in favor of an alternative view.  He proposes that the evaluative 
implications of paradigmatic thick terms are  “not-at-issue”  in normal contexts.  Roughly, 
an implication is at-issue if it is part of the main point of the conversation at hand, and it is 
not-at-issue if it is part of the background (2013: ch. 5).  Väyrynen takes this pragmatic view 
to be “superior to its rivals by standard methodological principles” from the philosophy of 
language and linguistics (2013: 10). 
 
Proponents of the Semantic View can provide at least two lines of response to Väyrynen’s 
argument involving objectionable thick terms.  For the first, it is important to note that 
Väyrynen explains the objector’s reluctance by holding that (a-d) all project the same 
evaluation beyond the truth-conditions of ‘chaste’.  But one might hold that there is no 
single evaluation projected by all of (a-d)—instead, there are at least two different claims 
implied throughout (a-d).  For example, just as ‘not happy’ conversationally implicates 
‘unhappy’, it is equally plausible that ‘not chaste’ conversationally implicates ‘unchaste’. 
Since chastity-objectors clearly do not want to imply that John is unchaste, they are 
reluctant to assert (a).  Moreover, (b-d) conversationally imply (or assert) that John might 
be chaste.  If chastity-objectors believe it is impossible for anyone to be chaste, then they 
will be reluctant to assert (b-d).  This piecemeal approach calls into doubt Väyrynen’s claim 
that a single evaluation projects beyond the truth-conditions of ‘chaste’.  Moreover, these 
ways of explaining the reluctance of chastity-objectors are perfectly consistent with the 
Semantic View (Kyle 2013a: 13-19).    
 
For a second response, it can be pointed out that even Väyrynen’s preferred explanation is 
consistent with the Semantic View (Kyle 2015).  The mere fact that an evaluation projects 
outside of the truth-conditions of ‘chaste’ does not entail that there is no evaluation within 
those truth-conditions.  For example, it is possible that ‘John is chaste’ conveys two 
evaluations, one that is part of its truth-conditions, and another that projects outside of 
them.  This possibility can be illustrated with the affirmative sentence ‘It is good that Sue is 
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moral’, which has an evaluative content within its truth-conditions and also projects one 
outside those truth-conditions.  Consider the corresponding non-affirmative sentences: 
  (a′) It is not good that Sue is moral. 
  (b′) Is it good that Sue is moral? 
  (c′) Possibly, it’s good that Sue is moral. 
  (d′) If it is good that Sue is moral, then we should applaud her.  
An evaluative content—that Sue is moral—is implied by each of (a′-d′), as well as the 
affirmative sentence.  So this evaluation projects much like the evaluation that Väyrynen 
thinks is projected by ‘chaste’.  But none of this precludes the affirmative statement from 
having a different evaluation as part of its truth-conditions, namely the evaluation associated 
with ‘good’.  Of course, this doubling of evaluation will have no purchase unless there is 
reason to think there is an evaluation within the truth-conditions of ‘chaste’.   
 
b. Semantic View 
What reason is there to think the evaluations of thick terms might be part of their truth-
conditions?  One potential reason stems from considering additional linguistic data.  Notice 
that the following claim seems highly awkward: 
(e) Sue is generous and not good in any way. 
Similar statements can be provided using negative thick terms and ‘not bad in any way’. The 
Semantic View provides a straightforward explanation of the awkwardness of (e).  This view 
can claim that (e) is a contradiction, assuming goodness-in-a-way is a part of the truth-
conditions associated with ‘generous’ (Kyle 2013a).  This, of course, is only one potential 
explanation—there may be other ways of explaining the awkwardness of (e), for example, 
by claiming that ‘generous’ presupposes or conventionally implicates an evaluation that 
incorporates goodness-in-a-way.  Just as before, the issue must be decided by figuring out 
which view is the best explanation of this and other linguistic data.  The matter is up for 
debate.     
 
Still, one might object that the Semantic View is ill-suited to explain the oddity of (e), since 
this view mistakenly predicts that (e) would sound odd in every context, yet there are some 
unusual contexts in which (e) would not sound odd.  For example, imagine Ebenezer 
Scrooge uttering (e) in a context where generosity is seen as a bad thing.  (e) might not seem 
awkward in this context.  However, it is a mistake to think that the Semantic View predicts 
that (e) is awkward in all contexts.  Consider that its second conjunct involves a quantifier 
expression—‘any’—and quantifiers are notoriously context-sensitive.  In one context, it 
might be true to say ‘O.J. Simpson is not good in any way’; but in other contexts, where 
being a good athlete is relevant to discussion, an utterance of the same sentence could be 
false.  Similarly, the second conjunct in (e) is true or false relative to context.  And it is only 
in contexts where generosity is a relevant way of being good that (e) should sound 
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contradictory.  In contexts where generosity is not a relevant way of being good—such as 
Scrooge’s context—(e) should not sound contradictory.  In those contexts, the first part of 
(e) could be true while the second part is false (Kyle 2013a).          
 
It’s worth emphasizing that the linguistic data about thick terms does not strictly entail the 
Semantic View, or the Pragmatic View.  Rather, the proponents of such views only claim 
that their respective view is part of the best explanation of a wide-body of linguistic data 
involving thick terms.  This matter has only been explored in recent years, with proponents 
on each side (Kyle 2013a; Väyrynen 2013). 
 
Another way of supporting the Semantic View stems from the shapelessness hypothesis, that 
the extensions of thick terms are only unified by evaluative similarity relations.  If the 
shapelessness hypothesis is true, then the truth-conditions associated with thick terms must 
be at least partly evaluative.  But what reason is there to accept the shapelessness hypothesis?     
 
The main support for shapelessness comes from the idea that thick terms seem to “outrun” 
any descriptive characterizations we can give to the items in their extensions (Kirchin 2010).  
Consider the various types of action that can be considered kind—shoveling snow for a 
neighbor, giving chocolate to a child, adopting a stray cat, standing up to someone’s bully, 
paying a complement to a friend, and so on.  Furthermore, there are some actions that 
would be considered kind in some circumstances even though the opposite action would be 
considered kind in other circumstances—for example, telling the truth is sometimes kind 
but so is telling a white lie.  Can these various actions be descriptively classified in a way that 
allows us to correctly characterize kind actions in new cases? The descriptive classification 
might be a long disjunction of unrelated features, a shapeless classification that would be 
unhelpful in confronting new cases.     
 
One way of opposing this argument is to show that the various actions mentioned above can 
be unified under a shapely descriptive classification.  For example, each of the above actions 
seems to benefit others by treating them as ends in themselves.  This shapely classification 
helps us classify at least some new cases of kind action (for example, giving food to a 
homeless person).  And benefit can be understood in purely descriptive terms—for 
example,. as the increasing of happiness.  So, it is not obvious that shapelessness is actually 
supported by the outrunning data given above, although other data could perhaps be 
provided. 
 
Suppose that thick terms do outrun our ability to provide wholly descriptive 
characterizations of their extensions.  Väyrynen argues that this does not support the 
Semantic View, because our inability to give a descriptive classification for a thick term can 
be explained even if the Semantic View is false.  Consider that, for some terms T, the 
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extension of T cannot be unified under relations that are expressible in independently 
intelligible T-free terms (that is, terms that can be understood independently of T).  For 
example, it might be that the extension of ‘pain’ across all sentient animals cannot be unified 
without employing the word ‘pain’ itself.  Now return to the question of what explains our 
inability to give a wholly descriptive characterization of the extension of ‘kind’.  It might be 
that the only way to characterize its extension is by employing the word ‘kind’ itself.  But 
this would not be a descriptive classification, if the Pragmatic View were true of ‘kind’.  It is 
just that the evaluative-ness of ‘kind’ would be explained by a pragmatic mechanism, rather 
than its truth-conditions.  So, if ‘kind’ is a term like T, then one could not give a wholly 
descriptive classification of the extension of ‘kind’, even if the Semantic View is false (2013 
193-201).   
 
 
6. Broader Applications 
Thick concepts have been an interest primarily among ethicists, although these concepts 
have made an entrance into discussions in other areas, such as aesthetics, metaphysics, 
philosophy of law, moral psychology, and epistemology.  This section focuses mainly on 
epistemology’s recent discussions on thick concepts, since these discussions have been the 
most extensive (outside of ethics).  But the discussions from the first four areas shall be 
briefly summarized. 
 
In aesthetics, there is much discussion about thick aesthetic concepts, like gaudy, elegant, 
delicate, and brilliant.  However, many of these discussions are centered on the question of 
whether there are any thick aesthetic concepts at all.  In this context, it is often assumed that 
an aesthetic concept is not thick if it is only pragmatically associated with evaluative content 
(recall that this assumption is sometimes made in ethics as well).  So, the discussions over 
whether there are any thick aesthetic concepts often mirrors the discussions in ethics on 
whether thick concepts are only pragmatically evaluative, or whether they are evaluative as a 
matter of truth-conditions (Bronzon 2009; Zangwill 2001).  It is worth noting that Burton’s 
Reductive View (discussed in 3a) is explicitly aimed at accounting for thick aesthetic 
concepts, as well as ethical ones.  
 
In metaphysics, Gideon Yaffe criticizes two competing views on the nature of freedom of 
will—one that equates freedom of will with self-expression and one that equates it with self-
transcendence.  Yaffe then holds that the debates between these approaches have proceeded 
from the (at least implicit) assumption that freedom of will is a descriptive concept. He argues 
that there are facts about freedom of will that are best explained if freedom of will is instead 
assumed to be thick.  According to Yaffe, the descriptive content of this concept would 
correspond to the features that make the agent either self-expressive or self-transcendent.  
But, according to Yaffe, this is not enough to account for freedom of will.  We must also 
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determine whether “the agent has choices that come about through worthwhile processes, 
processes possessing a certain kind of value” (2000: 219-20).  And it is this kind of value that 
corresponds to the evaluative content of freedom of will.     
 
In the philosophy of law David Enoch and Kevin Toh (2013) point out that legal statements 
often straddle the divide between the descriptive and the evaluative. They put forth the 
hypothesis that many legal statements express thick concepts.  Potential examples of such 
thick concepts may include crime, constitutional, inheritance, and infringement, though Enoch 
and Toh focus primarily on the concept legal, which they argue is a thick concept.  The 
descriptive content of legal consists in its representation of certain social facts, and its 
evaluative content is a kind of endorsement.  They do not assert that the thickness of legal 
can by itself settle debates over the nature of law.  But they hold that its classification as 
thick can situate these debates within a broader philosophical context analogous to that of 
ethics, and can introduce new options for thinking about the nature of law.  
 
Thick concepts also play a role in Gabriel Abend’s critique of current moral psychology and 
neuroscience.  Abend argues that moral psychologists and neuroscientists unwarrantedly 
restrict their research to thin ethical concepts, but ignore thick ones.  In particular, these 
scientists attempt to understand the psychological or neural bases for moral judgments, and 
they do so by testing various subjects’ judgments involving thin concepts like right and 
permissible.  But judgments involving thick ethical concepts, like cruel and courageous, have 
scarcely been featured in these experiments.  This is no small oversight, given “that thick 
concepts appear in some or much of people’s moral lives” (2011: 150).  Abend also argues 
that this problem cannot be fixed merely by expanding out psychological and neurological 
research to include thick ethical judgments, because thick concepts “challenge the 
conception of a hardwired and universal moral capacity in a way that thin concepts do not” 
(2011: 145-6).  In advancing this last point, Abend relies on the Disentangling Argument 
and the shapelessness hypothesis, as well as the claim that thick concepts presuppose 
institutional and cultural facts that do not hold universally.      
   
Outside of ethics, the most extensive discussions on thick concepts occur in epistemology.  
In 2008, a special issue of the journal Philosophical Papers (vol. 37 no. 3) was devoted to 
thick concepts in epistemology.  Examples of thick epistemic concepts include concepts like 
intellectual curiosity, truthfulness, open-mindedness, and dogmatic; these are contrasted with thin 
epistemic concepts, which are typically illustrated with concepts like justification, rationality, 
and knowledge.  The editors of this issue hold that “traditional epistemology has tended 
towards using the thin concepts in theorizing,” but “these thin epistemic concepts are far less 
prevalent in everyday discourse than the thick epistemic” (2008: 342).  The overarching 
question of this collection is whether epistemology would benefit from substantive 
investigations of thick epistemic concepts.   




One way of addressing this question is simply to do a substantive investigation of a particular 
thick epistemic concept, and to show that epistemological theories are enhanced by the 
investigation.  Two contributors to the Philosophical Papers collection take this approach.  
Catherine Elgin focuses on the concept trustworthy.  She argues that trustworthiness does not 
reduce to justified or reliable true belief, but can help to explain why justified or reliable 
true beliefs are valuable (2008: 371-87).  Harvey Siegel considers whether education is an 
epistemic virtue concept, and whether it makes sense to classify it as thick.  Siegel is 
skeptical about the helpfulness of the thin/thin distinction, but, to the extent that this 
distinction is viable, he maintains that education is “more thick than thin.”  He also seeks to 
clarify the relationship between education and virtue epistemology (2008: 467).   
 
The other contributors focus on general issues concerning thick epistemic concepts.  
Heather Battaly’s contribution seeks to address an objection advanced by Simon Blackburn 
against Non-Reductive Views.  According to Blackburn, Non-Reductive Views mistakenly 
imply that the differences in how we respond to, say, lewdness would not count as genuine 
disagreements, because the disputants would be employing different concepts and therefore 
talking past one another.  For example, a person who thinks the carnival was not lewd 
enough might be employing a different concept from someone who disvalues lewdness, 
because there would be “no detachable description, no ‘semantic anchor,’ that they can 
share” (1992: 297-99).  (This is an expanded version of the variability objection discussed in 
section 5a).  Battaly responds by arguing that certain thick epistemic concepts, such as open-
minded, are subject to combinatorial vagueness—these concepts have several independent 
conditions of application, but there is no sharp distinction between the conditions that are 
necessary or sufficient and those conditions that are neither.  Battaly holds that disputants 
can share the same vague concept, while disagreeing over which conditions are necessary 
and/or sufficient. Battaly maintains that this allows them to have genuine disagreements 
about whether the concept refers to an epistemic virtue.  According to Battaly, this at least 
shows that virtue epistemologists can disagree about the epistemic virtues without talking 
past one another (2008: 435-54).   
 
Väyrynen’s contribution focuses on whether thick and thin epistemic concepts can be 
distinguished in ways comparable to thick and thin ethical concepts, and on whether a focus 
on thick epistemic concepts can lead to a preferable epistemology.  Regarding the first issue, 
he argues that the way thick and thin concepts are typically distinguished in ethics provides 
no straightforward distinction between thick and thin epistemic concepts (2008: 390-95).  
Regarding the second, he argues that neither semantics nor substantive epistemological 
theory provides a basis for assigning thick epistemic concepts theoretical priority over thin 
epistemic concepts (2008: 395-408).  Väyrynen concludes by claiming that we so far lack 
good reasons for taking a theoretical turn to a thick epistemology.  




Despite Väyrynen’s final conclusion, the Philosophical Papers collection contains an explicit 
defense of the view that epistemology should expand its focus to thick epistemic concepts.  
Bernard Williams pushed for a similar expansion in the ethical sphere.  And the comparison 
here brings up an important question, which is the main question of Alan Thomas’ 
contribution: Can Williams’ treatment of thick ethical concepts be applied analogously in 
the epistemic sphere?  Recall that Williams holds that utterances involving thick ethical 
concepts cannot be objectively true.  Thus, if epistemologists want to model their theory of 
thick epistemic concepts after Williams’ view in ethics, it appears they will not be able to 
claim that there are objectively true claims involving thick epistemic concepts.  Thomas, 
however, points out that Williams’ non-objectivism in ethics “is based on the assumption 
that there are a variety of social worlds, structured by plural sets of thick ethical concepts.”  
But Williams’ view of thick epistemic concepts, such as truthfulness, allows for the possibility 
of “only one epistemic world.”  According to Thomas, truthfulness is “such a central need of 
human life that it can be abstractly modeled in a way that… [is] culturally invariant” (2008: 
368).      
 
Guy Axtell and J. Adam Carter focus on outlining a positive account for how thick epistemic 
concepts could play a central role in epistemological theory.  The account begins by claiming 
that epistemic value should be a central focus in epistemology, and that not all epistemic 
values can be reduced to the value of truth (or to some other single epistemic good).  Other 
values, such as open-mindedness, “can be useful in articulating our epistemic aims,” even if 
they cannot be thusly reduced (2008: 418).  Axtell and Carter also reject Thin Centralism in 
the epistemic sphere—the view that “general concepts like ‘justified’ and ‘ought’ are 
logically prior to and independent of specific reason-giving thick epistemic concepts of 
virtue and vice” (2008: 418).  In the epistemic sphere, ‘justified’ and ‘ought’ are primarily 
used to evaluate beliefs, but the rejection of Thin Centralism allows that there could be 
fundamental ways of evaluating agents with virtue and vice concepts, and that these 
evaluations may not be reducible to belief evaluations.  The above tenets open up the 
possibility of, what Axtell and Carter call, a “second-wave of virtue epistemology.”  This 
contrasts with the “first-wave” which takes thick epistemic concepts to be theoretically 
important primarily because they play a role in analyzing knowledge.  On the second wave 
of virtue epistemology, thick epistemic concepts are “a subject for research in their own 
right, apart from whatever role they might have in explaining knowledge” (2008: 427).    
 
Many authors in the Philosophical Papers collection take knowledge to be a paradigmatic 
example of a thin epistemic concept (Battaly 2008: 435; Axtell and Carter 2008: 427; 
Thomas 2008: 363; Väyrynen 2008: 392; Kotzee and Wanderer 2008: 339).  It is not 
immediately clear whether their arguments rely substantively on this assumption, but the 
assumption has been contested in a separate context.  Brent Kyle argues that knowledge is 
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actually a thick concept.  According to Kyle, knowledge is best accounted for as a close 
relation between a descriptive content—true belief—and an evaluative content—justification.  
If successful, this argument would establish that traditional epistemology has already focused 
on at least one thick concept—namely knowledge.  But Kyle’s main goal is not to defend the 
traditional focus of epistemological theories.  Instead, he aims to argue that the thickness of 
knowledge can explain why the Gettier Problem arises.  He does so by arguing that the 
Gettier Problem is a specific instance of a general problem about analyzing thick concepts.  
It is worth noting that his argument takes no stand on whether thick concepts can be 
analyzed, or on whether the Gettier Problem is resolvable (Kyle 2013b). 
 
Generally speaking, thick concepts have become a source of optimism for many 
philosophers who find traditional research within normative disciplines to be myopic,  
stagnant, or misdirected.  Nevertheless, it is still a matter of debate whether a plausible 
theory of thick concepts actually has the implications typically hoped for.  In particular, the 
literature on thick concepts still contains lively debates regarding fundamental issues such as 
the Disentangling Argument, the shapelessness hypothesis, non-reductivism, and the 
Semantic View.  And if proponents of the significance of thick concepts make assumptions 
regarding these controversial issues, then their views will be met with significant opposition, 
at least until these issues are resolved.  But, on the flip side, if opposing theorists account for 
all normativity with thin concepts, and take these concepts to be non-factual, they too will 
meet significant opposition. The recent debates about thick concepts are largely responsible 
for this.  Ultimately, whatever approach one takes to these fundamental issues, it is clear 
that theories of value and normativity cannot be complete unless they give some attention to 
the thick. 
 
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed in this article do not reflect the official positions of 
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